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ELITES, IDENTITY POLITICS, GUNS, AND THE
MANUFACTURE OF LEGAL RIGHTS
Calvin Massey*
INTRODUCTION

Michael Dorf claims that "[c]ourts adjust doctrine largely in
response to social and political movements"1 that are forged in
identity politics with which the judiciary is sympathetic. While
Professor Dorf disavows any claim "that legal reasoning is only so
much window dressing for political judgments"2 and concedes that "a
link to an identity politics movement is... [n]either necessary [n]or
sufficient to securing judicial recognition" 3 of new rights rooted in
equality or autonomy, he does believe that an identity politics
movement "is a substantial aid" to that end.4 He buttresses his thesis
by cataloguing the social and legal history that has resulted in broader
legal rights for African Americans, women, and sexual minorities.5 In
each case, the judiciary became receptive to claims for new legal rights
as a consequence of changing social and cultural attitudes that
enabled judges to include formerly excluded groups within the general
umbrella of equality or personal autonomy. Dorf's descriptive claim
is that the identity politics of these movements reinforced the
doctrinal claims made by proponents of change.6 Black Americans
argued successfully that apartheid was a system of racial
subordination, no matter how much nominal equality was delivered to
the separate races. A moral claim of equal human dignity congealed
around the identity politics of the civil rights movement, and that
political cluster undergirded the doctrinal change wrought by
rejection of "separate but equal" in Brown v. Board of Education.7 A
similar process informed the doctrinal changes in equal protection
that recognized sex discrimination as presumptively void and subject

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law.

1. Michael C. Dorf, Identity Politicsand the Second Amendment, 73 Fordham L.
Rev. 549, 550 (2004).
2. Id. at 551.
3. Id. at 553.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 553-64.
6. Id. at 553.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to heightened scrutiny8 and, as Dorf posits, the same process is
unfolding with respect to the autonomy and equality claims of
homosexuals.9
But when it comes to firearms, identity politics play a distinctly
different role in Professor Dorf's calculus. He contends that there is a
"substantial mismatch between... the constitutional arguments for an
individual right to own and possess firearms and.., the identity
politics movement that underwrites those arguments."'
The
constitutional arguments sound in history and in a right of selfdefense, but Dorf sees a mismatch because the identity of the
proponents of those arguments does not reinforce them. The
proponents "are neither minutemen nor ... law-abiding inner-city
residents most likely to be victimized by crime.""
Professor Dorf makes two descriptive claims and abjures any
"prescriptive statements" other than his final conclusion that it is
"entirely appropriate" to "buttress formal legal arguments with
attitude-changing actions addressed to the broad mass of the public."12
I have no quarrel with his description of the process by which African
Americans, women, and homosexuals have transformed both public
attitudes and constitutional doctrine. I do have a bone to pick with
Dorf's contention that there is a "substantial mismatch" between the
doctrinal claims and the identity politics of the gun rights movement, 3
but it is not a very big one, and it pales in comparison to my
fundamental point, which is frankly prescriptive.
My prescriptive argument stems from the fact that the Second
Amendment is, in Chris Eisgruber's words, "a constitutional ghost
town,"' 14 a textual structure from which all contextual life has fled. I
have contended in prior work that when the intended function of
constitutional text cannot be accomplished, the text should be
interpreted by application of a constitutional cy pres doctrine." As
with charitable trusts, if the object of the provision cannot be
accomplished, we should seek to get as close as possible to its
intended purpose.
The Second Amendment should be given
contemporary meaning in light of that principle. I do not suggest that
we should ignore identity politics when confronting the Second
Amendment, but I do not think it should be the driving force of the
Amendment's interpretation. I shall first outline the points upon

8. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
9. Dorf, supra note 1, at 559-60.
10. Id. at 552.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 572.
13. Id. at 552.
14. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government 124 (2001).
15. See Calvin R. Massey, Silent Rights: The Ninth Amendment and the
Constitution's Unenumerated Rights 97-115 (1995); infra text following note 56.
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which I disagree with Professor Dorf and then elaborate on my
prescriptive claim.
I. THE IDENTITY POLITICS OF GUN RIGHTS

Professor Dorf engages in caricature when he describes the identity
politics movement that underlies the claim that the Second
Amendment secures an individual right to own and possess firearms.
These people are the "bubba vote," "Nascar dads," and "guys with
Confederate flags in their pickup trucks."' 6 They are, we are told,
"angry white men"'" who are, "broadly speaking, anti-abortion, antiaffirmative action, anti-gay marriage, anti-tax, and pro-gun." 8 But
Professor Dorf makes little attempt to probe the reality of his
assertions, a surprising omission in an article that Professor Dorf
admits "obviously sounds in legal realism."' 19 It turns out that gun
owners in America are not quite as monolithic as Professor Dorf
would like to believe: "disproportionately white, male, and rural."2
There are about 294 million Americans2' organized into about 107
million households. 2 About 40% of these households, or forty-three
million, own firearms.2 3 Because there are, on average, 2.57 people
per household, approximately 110 million Americans live in a

16. Dorf, supra note 1, at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Id. (citing Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 413,455 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 551.
20. Id. at 552.
21. This is an estimate by the United States Bureau of the Census, which
maintains a "population clock" that displays the estimated United States population
at any given moment, using estimates of birth and death rates, as well as net
migration.
See U.S. Census Bureau,
U.S. POPCIock
Projection, at
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/popclock (last visited Sept. 11, 2004); U.S. Census
Bureau,
U.S.
and
World
Population
Clocks
POPClocks,
at
http://www.census.gov/main/www/popclock.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2004).
22. This is an estimate by the United States Bureau of the Census, based on 2000
Census data. See U.S. Census Bureau, Projections of Households by Type: 1995 to
2010, Series 1, 2, 3, at http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/hhfam/tableln.txt (last visited Sept. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Household Census Data].
23. There are a number of sources for this information, all of which is derived
from polling data. A useful comprehensive overview, using data from 1988 and 1996,
is John R. Lott, Jr., More Guns, Less Crime 36-42 (1998). More recent surveys have
been conducted by both the Gallup and Harris polling organizations. A 2000 Gallup
poll revealed that 39% of Americans have a gun at home and another 2% have a gun
somewhere else, such as in their vehicle. See Michael D. Cohen, About Four in 10
Americans Report Owning a Gun, Gallup Poll News Service, Oct. 5, 2000, at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/print.aspx?ci=2473. A 2001 Harris poll revealed
that 39% of Americans have a gun in their "home or garage." See Humphrey Taylor,
Gun Ownership: Two in Five Americans Live in Gun-Owning Households, Harris
Poll
#25,
(May
30,
2001),
at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp?PID=234 [hereinafter Harris
Poll #25].
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household with firearms.24 Approximately half of all Republicans
own a gun, slightly less than a third of Democrats own a gun, and 41%
of independents own guns." Slightly less than twice as many men as
women own guns, although the rate of increase of gun ownership
among women is extremely high. If recent rates of increase continue,
it is not unrealistic to project gun ownership among women beginning
to reach levels of about two-thirds that of men.2 6 Gun ownership is
highest among those whose annual income is between $50,000 and
$75,000, but all income brackets higher than $35,000 exhibit gun
ownership in excess of the national average.27 Gun ownership is fairly
evenly distributed around the United States: 43% of Southerners own
a gun, 39% of Westerners and Midwesterners own a gun, and 34% of
Easterners own a gun.28 About a third more whites than blacks are
gun owners.2 9 Gun ownership is highest in rural areas (slightly over
60%) and lowest in large cities of over 500,000 population (around
20%).31 While it may be a literal truth that gun owners are
disproportionately white, male, rural, Republicans living in the South,
West, or Midwest, it is a truth that obscures the large numbers of gun
owners who are none of those things: racial minorities, women,
Easterners, Democrats or Independents, and urban dwellers.
In fact, it is not too hard to find examples of these contrarian gun
owners. Consider just two random successive days of news reporting
by the New York Times. On March 8, 2004, the New York Times
reported on the "Women's Shooting Sports League, which gathers the
first Monday of each month in Chelsea for a night of rifle fire and
female bonding."3 1 This Chelsea is in Manhattan, New York, not
London, and certainly not Manhattan, Montana or Manhattan,
Kansas. New York's women shooters meet each month at the
Westside Rifle and Pistol Range on West 20th Street (about forty
blocks south of Fordham Law School) where, according to the New
York Times, they fire off several hundred rounds of high-velocity
lead.32 This happens monthly in Manhattan, which is decidedly not
24. See Household Census Data, supra note 22.
25. Harris Poll #25, supra note 23, at tbl. 3.
26. Lott, supra note 23, at 37-38. Between 1988 and 1996 the percentage of
women who were gun owners increased by 70% and "women went from owning guns
at 41 percent of the rate of men to over 53 percent." Id. at 38. Expressed differently,
between 1988 and 1996, the rate at which women owned guns as a percentage of male
gun ownership increased by 19.5%. If that rate of increase remained constant
between 1996 and 2004 (the next eight year interval), women in 2004 own guns at
slightly more than 63% of the rate of male gun ownership.
27. Harris Poll #25, supra note 23, at tbl. 3.
28. Id.
29. Lott, supra note 23, at 39 fig. 3.3.
30. Id. at 40 fig. 3.4.
31. Alan Feuer, Female Bonding, Punctuated by Gunfire, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,
2004, at A17.
32. Id.
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western or rural, virtually cleansed of Republicans, where the "bubba
vote" is virtually non-existent, a place where almost nobody can
identify a NASCAR driver, and where the "angry white men" are
more likely to model themselves after Michael Moore than Dick
Cheney. On March 9, 2004, the New York Times reported on the
attitude of gay Republicans toward President Bush in the wake of his
call for a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriages. The
article began by presenting the attitudes of a Pennsylvania
Republican, Margaret Leber, "a lesbian in a long-term relationship"
who objects to the President's proposed constitutional amendment,
but who "is also a member of the Pink Pistols, an organization of gay
and lesbian gun owners., 33 It turns out that Ms. Leber supports the
President mostly out of her concern for her gun possession rights:
"All the Democrats just rolled into Congress to vote for this guncontrol bill," she says. "Somebody with my values and beliefs can't be
a single issue voter."34
Of course, anecdotal evidence is selective, and in this case the
anecdotes are newsworthy because they run counter to the
stereotyped image of gun owners. While the demographic facts serve
to remind us that the tent of gun ownership is a big one, it is also one
that shelters a disproportionately large number of rural white men of
at least modest affluence. Perhaps the problem with the identity
politics of gun ownership is one of perception, the public's proclivity
to indulge in exclusively stereotypical thinking. As Amy Heath,
Manhattan resident and founder of the Women's Shooting Sports
League, puts it: "When people think of gun owners, they think of
butt-scratching bubbas with no teeth."3 5
Perhaps the lesson Professor Dorf invites us to learn is that an
identity politics movement that is popularly thought of as comprising
toothless butt-scratching bubbas is not likely to have much impact on
legal doctrine. But why is that so? Even granting the caricature, are
not toothless butt-scratching bubbas fellow citizens? Is what underlies
this demeaning characterization the assumption that such folk are
36 Surely that
lawless predators, as in James Dickey's Deliverance?
cannot be universally so; even granting the stereotype that Professor
Dorf perpetuates, most such people are likely to be ignorant,
unsophisticated rustics who may harbor values that we in the elite do
not share, but who are unlikely to use their firearms to advance their
values through criminal action. 7
33. David D. Kirkpatrick, Gay and Republican, But Not Necessarily Disloyal to
President,N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2004, at Al.
34. Id.
35. Feuer, supra note 31, at A17.
36. James Dickey, Deliverance (1994).
37. If this were not so, surely we would observe considerably more violent crime
by rural white men of modest affluence than, in fact, we do see. Cf U.S. Census
Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2003, at tbl. 306 (2003 violent crime
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Perhaps the ultimate point of Professor Dorf's article on identity
politics and legal change is to demonstrate that only those identity
politics movements that resonate with the values of the elite class
from which the judiciary is drawn are likely to influence legal
doctrine. If so, we may better understand why it is that gun owners do
not have traction in the courts, but we are left with another quandary:
What justification is there for developing constitutional doctrine to
suit current fashions of social elites?
Professor Dorf offers some answers. He thinks that constitutional
doctrine moves in response to changed societal attitudes, and that
such changes are most likely to occur when rights claims "have been
tied to a social movement to end some form of oppression of an
identity group."3 8 However, that cannot be the complete answer. The
increasing legal and social ostracism faced by tobacco smokers would
certainly qualify as oppressive, at least from the perspective of a
tobacco addict. The national war on drugs would certainly strike most
marijuana users as oppressive. But social movements to end
oppression of these identity groups are, almost without exception,
failures when it comes to altering the legal doctrine that has an impact
upon them.3 9 The lesson we are invited to learn is that only identity
politics movements that resonate with extremely broad cultural and
social changes are likely to produce change in constitutional doctrine.
Such a conclusion, however, simply raises more questions. If the
only identity politics movements that have the power to alter our
understanding of the Constitution are those that produce cultural and
social changes that are so widely accepted that they approach
consensus, why should judges alter the Constitution to do what society
will do in any event? Put another way, why should judges preempt
the democratic process to declare new rights with little if any pedigree
in text, intention, history, or constitutional structure when the
democratic process will eventually recognize those rights through
statutory change?
The costs of such preemption generally go
unrecognized. When the judiciary declares new rights that the people
will eventually come to recognize through democratic processes, the
people are both excused from their responsibility of doing so and
rate in rural areas was 211 per 100,000 population; in metropolitan areas the violent
crime
rate
was
560
per
100,000
population),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/03statab/law.pdf. Of course, it's possible that
those toothless butt-scratching bubbas are traveling to metropolitan areas to wreak
their criminal havoc on unsuspecting urbanites.
38. Dorf, supra note 1, at 553.
39. A recent exception is Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), in which
the court of appeals concluded that there was a sufficient probability that the
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000), was an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress's Commerce Clause authority to warrant a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the Act to prevent plaintiffs, users and growers of marijuana for
medical purposes, from possessing, obtaining, manufacturing, or providing marijuana
for medical use.
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deprived of the ability to reinforce their commitment to selfgovernment. That these costs are intangible does not make them less
costly; indeed, it is their apparent invisibility that is worrisome
because we fail to account for these costs until they manifest
themselves in an atrophied democracy.
Of course, there are also costs of judicial inaction. The pace of
democratic change is often slower than that of judicial change and, in
the interim, as we wait for legislatures and executives to act, rights
that will ultimately be embraced go unrecognized to the detriment of
the putative holder of those rights. This assumes that when judges
declare new constitutional rights they are highly skilled seers of the
cultural and social changes that will ultimately produce ambient legal
change via the democratic process. Perhaps they are, but I am less
optimistic than Professor Dorf about the judge as fortune teller.
Bismarck famously advised us not to watch either sausages or laws
If Bismarck were a contemporary American
being made.
constitutional law professor, he would surely add constitutional
adjudication to the list.4" Of course, it may be that when "Bismarck
40. Bismarck is popularly attributed as the source of the remark, but there is no
known source that definitely establishes Bismarck as the author of the quip, although
a host of internet quotation sources credit Bismarck, as a Google search for
"Bismarck" and "law" and "sausages" will reveal. A number of judicial opinions cite
Bismarck but the earliest is a 1958 opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, which noted
"the famous epigram of Bismarck, 'to retain respect for sausages and laws, one must
not watch them in the making."' In re Graham, 104 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. 1958). Fred
Shapiro, public affairs librarian at the Yale Law Library, is of the opinion that the
lack of any nineteenth century source attributing the remark to Bismarck implies that
Bismarck never uttered it, and that "the attribution is a later tradition." See E-mail
from Fred Shapiro, Public Affairs Librarian, Yale Law Library (Dec. 4, 2002,
12:44PM), at http://lawlibrary.ucdavis.edu/LAWLIB/Dec02/0082.html [hereinafter
UC Davis: Bismarck, Laws, and Sausages]. Kent Olson, a librarian at the University
of Virginia Law Library, has noted that an American nineteenth-century source
attributes the remark to an unknown Illinois legislator:
Some twenty years ago, as I was sitting in the... Illinois legislature,
watching its closing hours, a member who had never spoken during the
entire session arose to address the House .... He said: "I have come to the
conclusion that the making of laws is like the making of sausages-the less
you know about the process the more you respect the result."
Frank W. Tracy, The Report of the Committee on Uniform Laws, of the American
Bankers' Association, 15 Banking L.J. 542 (1898), quoted in UC Davis: Bismarck,
Laws, and Sausages, supra; see also Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50 (D.C.
Cir. 1984). In Block, then-Judge Scalia began the opinion:
This case, involving legal requirements for the content and labeling of meat
products such as frankfurters, affords a rare opportunity to explore
simultaneously both parts of Bismarck's aphorism that "No man should see
how laws or sausages are made." At issue are regulations promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture prescribing labeling requirements for meat
products made in part with meat separated from bone by crushing bones and
meat and forcing the resulting paste through a sieve.
Id. at 51 (internal citation omitted). Other judicial citations to Bismarck include
Atlantic Fish Spotters Ass'n v. Evans, 321 F.3d 220, 226 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Chancellor
Bismarck's famous comparison of making laws to making sausage 'is at no time more
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remarked that no one should wish to know too much about the
making of laws or sausages, he meant that the process was distasteful
but the results were not."4 1 That could be so with respect to sausages

(though I doubt it), but it is surely not so with respect to law, for law is
as much about process as substance.
To be fair, Professor Dorf qualifies his claim. His point "is that the

Court responds to social and political movements, not that [such]
movements.., necessarily have justice on their side."42 He does not
claim "that the Court always adjusts doctrine to track social attitudes
exactly,"43 but rather that over time "constitutional doctrine evolves
with social attitudes."'

According to Dorf, when identity politics

movements are the engine of such evolution, they succeed when they
turn public opinion in their favor and can urge doctrinal change that
meshes neatly with the social and political message; they fail when
they are opposed by other sympathetic identity politics movements,
especially when one movement is making "an individual libertarian
claim pitted against the asserted interests of a vulnerable
population"4 5 that is itself an identity politics movement. This latter

pattern, asserts Dorf, characterizes the movement for gun rights.
Perhaps Professor Dorf's description is correct, but even his refined
and qualified description invites us to conclude that identity politics
movements succeed when they appeal to the consciousness and
experiences of the legal, social, and cultural elites that compose the
judiciary. Professor Dorf hints as much when he notes that Justices
Scalia and Thomas sometimes signal their sympathies with what Dorf
characterizes as the identity politics of "angry white men."46 In fact, in
those cases, Justice Scalia typically has charged the majority of the

Supreme Court with kowtowing to elite tastes as it fashions
constitutional law,47 rather than relying upon text and historical
apt than during the appropriations process"' (citation omitted)); In re Top Grade
Sausage, Inc., 227 F.3d 123, 130 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[A]dmonition often attributed to
Bismarck that 'No man should see how laws or sausages are made."'); Danielson
Food Products, Inc. v. Poly-Clip Systems, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1142-43 (N.D. I11.
2000) ("When Bismarck remarked that no one should wish to know too much about
the making of laws or sausages, he meant that the process was distasteful but the
App.
results were not."); Stewart v. IndustrialCommission, 481 N.E.2d 1279, 1285 (I11.
Ct. 1985) (Webber, P.J., dissenting) (noting that the court's result "recalls Bismarck's
aphorism: if you like law and sausage, you do not want to know too much about how
either is made").
41. Danielson Food, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-43.
42. Dorf,supra note 1, at 560.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 567.
46. Id. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court "is the product of a law-profession culture[] that has largely
signed on to the.., agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at
eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual
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tradition. Of course, it may be the case that Justice Scalia's fondness
for text and tradition are simply rhetorical tropes that enable him to
respond to the identity politics of the political right without overtly
appearing to do so. I suppose the conclusion that we are invited to
draw from this line of suppositional inquiry is that constitutional law
boils down to a question of whose identity politics ox is being gored by
the Court at any given moment. Perhaps that is so; but if it is, our
Republic and its Constitution are in sufficiently big trouble that
discussion of the identity politics of firearms seems hardly worth the
candle.
Even if Professor Dorf is correct in all points-that gun owners are
rural, politically right-wing white men and that an identity politics
movement is a huge boost to judicial recognition of legal rights that
secure the social objectives of the identity politics movement48-his
argument ultimately exposes a deeply disturbing aspect of
contemporary constitutional law. The conclusion to be drawn is that
only some identity politics movements have traction when it comes to
igniting legal change that protects the movement. The claims of
women, racial minorities, and homosexuals have such power; the
claims of gun owners, tobacco smokers, and marijuana users, to cite
just a few disfavored identity politics movements, lack the same force.
Professor Dorf's apparent answer is that these latter identity politics
movements assert an "individual libertarian" interest that is in tension
with "the asserted interests of a vulnerable population."49 But who
composes the "vulnerable population" threatened by tobacco users or
marijuana smokers? Something more is at work, and the possibilities
are not all benign.
If Professor Dorf's description is accurate, we should be troubled.
Reliance on the appeal of identity politics as a substantial factor in
constitutional adjudication-perhaps a decisive factor--raises
additional questions about the legitimacy of the process. For
constitutional interpretation to be plausible, it must use a method that
relies upon some source of meaning extrinsic to the subjective tastes
of the justices du jour. It is as unacceptable to have constitutional
interpretation driven by the identity politics of right-wing zealots, as it
conduct."); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(writing that the Court has "embarked on a course of inscribing one after another of
the.., counter majoritarian preferences of the society's law-trained elite ... into our
Basic Law"); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When
the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than
the villains-and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the views and values
of the lawyer class from which the Court's Members are drawn."). Justice Scalia
continued in Lawrence: "[The] Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing
from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement
are observed." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602.
48. Dorf, supra note 1, at 552-53.
49. Id. at 567.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
is to have constitutional meaning informed by the identity
left-wing zealots. This is not to claim that there is but one
legitimate form of constitutional interpretation; it is to say
aggregation of the personal preferences of the justices
legitimate form of interpretation.
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politics of
authentic,
that mere
is not a

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CY PRES APPROACH TO THE SECOND
AMENDMENT

How should we approach the interpretation of the Second
Amendment, if resolution of the issue through the lens of identity
politics and elite tastes is unsatisfactory? The answer to that depends
on which theory of constitutional interpretation is used, so let me
emphasize at the outset that I am guided by a few general principles.
It is a written Constitution, so I start with text, which often does not
supply answers. So it is with the Second Amendment: choose your
clause, but only one, and text will provide an answer. Alas, there are
two clauses. However unhelpful text may be at times, I also assert
that all of the text matters. Put another way, a constitutional
interpretation that renders any portion of text useless today is not a
good interpretation. I disagree with Robert Bork's ink blot analogythe idea that some portions of text are so enigmatic that they should
be treated as obscured by an ink blot.5 ° So, too, do I disagree with the
notion that some portions of constitutional text have been rendered
nugatory by social change that has occurred since the Founding Era. I
repeat: In my constitutional calculus, all of the text must have a
current meaning.
Context, or the place of any given bit of text within the structure of
the Constitution, is also helpful, though in the case of the Second
Amendment there is little insight to be gained by examining its
structural role as an enumerated right. From a purely structural
standpoint, it is equally plausible that the Second Amendment secures
a collective right of the people of the respective states to maintain
their militia independent of the federal government or an individual
right to possess and own firearms. Thus, the competing interpretive
armies in the Second Amendment war battle to a draw on the field of
structural argument.

50. See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
100th Cong. 249 (1989) (testimony of Robert Bork).
I do not think you can use the ninth amendment unless you know something
of what it means. For example, if you had an amendment that says
"Congress shall make no" and then there is an ink blot and you cannot read
the rest of it and that is the only copy you have, I do not think the court can
make up what might be under the ink blot if you cannot read it.
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History is a useful addition to text and structure, but history is itself
a multifaceted concept. Included within history are such disparate
notions as original intention, original meaning, past practices and
understandings, and the trend, or direction, of practices and
understandings. Too many trees have already died in the historical
wars over the Second Amendment, so I shall not slaughter more to
repeat here what has been said before; rather, I endorse the nuancefilled version of Second Amendment history offered by Saul Cornell
and Nathan DeDino.51
However helpful history may be, it is rarely the decisive factor in
constitutional interpretation, because history is itself interpretation: it
offers a range of plausible explanations rather than definitive
answers. 52 Thus, when text, structure, and history are irresolute, we
Prudential
often turn to even softer modes of reasoning.
considerations, or what is workable or practical, are helpful in some
circumstances, but are not particularly relevant to interpretation of
the Second Amendment. Finally, what Philip Bobbitt calls ethical
considerations,53 or the felt sense of the constitutional "ethos" at any
given moment in time, is what Professor Dorf emphasizes in his
article. But, as Dorf admits, the role of social movements advanced
by identity politics is an incomplete explanation of constitutional
development.54
All of these aspects of constitutional interpretation are relevant, but
none is determinative by itself. The best interpretation is one that
provides a plausible account of all of these modes of constitutional
interpretation. An interpretation that makes sense of text and
structure, fits comfortably into both static and dynamic readings of
history, is workable and practical, and is in harmony with the
consensus of social and cultural norms, is a sound interpretation. An
interpretation that is awkward, implausible, or contrary to any of
these interpretational modes is not sound, is unlikely to prevail, and is
even less likely to endure.
The problem with the Second Amendment is that the text delivers
two plausible but contrary answers; structural analysis is of no help,
prudential considerations support either the collective or individual
rights approach, and appeal to social and cultural norms leads to sharp
disagreement rather than consensus. History is thus an appealing
avenue for resolution of the issue, but the problem with resort to
history is that there is so much poor and highly partisan historical
analysis that is employed on both sides of the Second Amendment
51. Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American
Origins of Gun Control,73 Fordham L. Rev. 487 (2004).
52. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659, 678-83
(1987) ("Rule 9: At best, history yields probabilities,not certainties.").
53. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate (1982).
54. See Dorf, supra note 1, at 552-53.
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war. Thus, to wade into history is ordinarily to enlist in one of the two
contending armies. In the middle lies a lonely band of blue-helmeted
historical peacekeepers, who argue that the Second Amendment
secures a "civic right.... exercised by citizens, not individuals,.., who
act together in a collective manner, for a distinctly public purpose:
participation in a well-regulated militia."55 For purposes of my
prescriptive argument, I accept this historical assessment as the best
account of the Second Amendment's meaning. But that reading of
history raises another problem: The Second Amendment as a civic
right is a lifeless husk in our contemporary circumstances. The militia
is no longer the armed citizenry, coming together to muster and drill
for collective defense, a citizen-soldiery sufficient to obviate a
standing army. Today, the militia is as likely to be in Iraq as in Iowa,
the standing army is a fixture of the military landscape, and the militia
is simply the operational reserve of the standing army. It is thus
accurate to call the Second Amendment a constitutional ghost town.56
But just as ghost towns can be revitalized by finding a new and
contemporary purpose, so it should be with constitutional ghost
towns.
When the original purpose and meaning of a constitutional
provision can no longer be attained because of irrevocably changed
circumstances, it is necessary to employ the cy pres principle. The
ghostly constitutional provision must be read in a way that enables us
to get as close as possible to what was once intended but is no longer
possible. There are several ways of doing so; their explanation
requires a brief foray into actual constitutional practice and theories
of constitutional interpretation.
The very nature of a written
constitution requires that some attention be paid to the intended
meaning of that text. I am not making the usual originalist claim that
we are bound eternally by the intentions of the founders; rather I am
asserting a version of the argument made by Keith Whittington that
an inescapable aspect of a written constitution is that there is intended
meaning imbedded in text.5 7 It is, of course, an entirely separate
question whether we are, or ought to be, bound by that intended
meaning, once it is located.58 Time does not permit development of
this inquiry, which has occupied a good deal of thought of
contemporary constitutional theorists, so I must be content with
making some claims that, admittedly, deserve a deeper foundation
than I will provide in this forum.

55. Cornell & DeDino, supra note 51, at 491.
56. Eisgruber, supra note 14, at 124.
57. See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning,
Original Intent, and Judicial Review (1999).
58. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 52, at 662-66 ("Rule 1: History itself will not prove
anything nonhistorical");id. at 666-68 ("Rule 2: History is the servant, not the master,
of constitutionalinterpretation.").
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Prevailing constitutional practice conflates two separate inquiries:
the search for the intended meaning of text and the search for a
satisfactory contemporary application of text. Whittington unbundled
these quests and labeled the former task constitutional interpretation
and called the latter constitutional construction.5 9 The difference lies
in the fact that text, even when authoritatively interpreted, may still
To use
be insufficiently determinate to serve our purposes.
Whittington's example, a textual instruction to "buy a dog" tells us we
may not buy a cat, a parrot, or a python, but does not help us choose
among spaniels, retrievers, shepherds, and terriers, or, having selected
a group and a breed, to pick the precise dog.6" That non-interpretive
task is the work of constitutional construction, and the essence of that
effort is fundamentally political-it is an exercise of popular
Our two-centuries-old tradition of constitutional
sovereignty.61
judicial review, however, ties together the separate functions of
interpretation and construction into one product: constitutional law.
Our practice of constitutional conflation exacerbates the
interpretive conflict surrounding the Second Amendment, for the
outcome becomes "all or nothing." Advocates of gun control argue
for a collective rights reading so that firearms can be regulated or
Advocates of the individual rights reading see that
banned.
interpretation as critical to prevention of their greatest fear,
confiscation of private firearms. Yet, a constitutional middle ground
can be reached if the constitutional cy pres doctrine is applied.
I shall apply the constitutional cy pres doctrine in two different
contexts. In the first, I shall use constitutional cy pres as an aid to the
conventional approach to constitutional interpretation. This approach
seeks to provide a plausible account of text, structure, and history
while delivering a workable result that is consistent with widely-held
contemporary values. In the second, I shall apply constitutional cy
pres in the context of Whittington's approach to constitutional
This approach separates the judicial task of
interpretation.
interpretation from the essentially political task of construction.
Application of constitutional cy pres to the Second Amendment
within the context of conventional judicial review requires the
constitutional analyst to project the impossible-to-achieve intended
objectives of the Second Amendment at the narrowest level of
generality that is sufficient to attain those lost objectives in today's
world. An analogy to charitable trusts, from which, of course, cy pres
is derived, may be helpful. A trust to benefit a charity aiding Union
veterans of the Civil War states an objective that is impossible to
achieve, because there are no living Union veterans. Perhaps the next

59. Whittington, supra note 57, at 7.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., id. at 110-59.
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level of generality at which the trust purposes can be practically
formulated is to aid all veterans of American armed service. Of
course, in most charitable trust circumstances we may wish to inquire
into the purposes of the donor, in order to restate the failed trust's
purposes most closely in accord with the donor's intentions. Thus, a
trust to benefit the education of women at Radcliffe College states an
objective that is impossible to attain because Radcliffe College no
longer exists. Application of the generality principle might indicate
that the trust should benefit the Radcliffe Institute of Harvard
University, or perhaps to benefit female students at Harvard.
Suppose that further inquiry into the donor's intent produced
convincing evidence that the donor's desire was that the trust benefit
the higher education of women in greater Boston in a single-sex
environment, in which case it is possible that the trust should now
benefit Wellesley College. In the context of the Second Amendment,
we may usefully pay attention to each of these variables: generality
and intention.
The Second Amendment was intended to accomplish several
related civic objectives, but foremost among them was collective
defense against external threats to civic peace and obviation of the
need for a standing army. The first objective can be fulfilled, and is
presently being fulfilled, by evisceration of the second objective. Of
course, we are not about to repudiate our commitment to a standing
army, so the cy pres dilemma becomes rather stark.
How do we reformulate the objective of providing for our collective
defense while embracing the standing army? There are several
possibilities.
We might implement the Second Amendment's
collective defense objective as a guarantee of every citizen's right
(and, perhaps, obligation) to perform military service. That move
emphasizes the collective aspect of the Second Amendment and
would, no doubt, be welcome to the advocates of gun control. Or, we
might emphasize the self-defense aspect of the Second Amendment,
and read it today as a guarantee of a limited individual right to use
and possess firearms for purposes of lawful defense of oneself and
others.6 2 Gun rights enthusiasts would no doubt prefer that reading.
The problem is that the basic interpretive difficulty with the text of
the Second Amendment has now been carried forward to the next
level of generality at which its intentions can be applied in a
contemporary context. This does not suggest that constitutional cy
pres is a failure, but it does suggest that we must engage in what
Whittington calls constitutional construction,63 whatever label the
Supreme Court might place on this analytical task.

62. I have made an extended argument in this direction. See Calvin Massey, Guns,
Extremists, and the Constitution,57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1095 (2000).
63. Whittington, supra note 57, at 7.

2004]

THE MANUFACTURE OF LEGAL RIGHTS

587

If we untie constitutional interpretation from constitutional
construction, as Whittington asks us to do, and then apply
constitutional cy pres to the problem of the Second Amendment, our
Strict adherence to Whittington's
task is of lesser difficulty.
cause
us to say that the proper
would
formula
dichotomous
interpretation of the Second Amendment is that it secures a civic right
to possess and use firearms only in the course of performing the civic
duty of collective self-defense as a citizen-soldier. Beyond that, the cy
pres task is for the people, as sovereigns, to reformulate the Second
Amendment in terms that suit our contemporary needs best. In a real
sense, the long-running argument about the meaning of the Second
Amendment and the proper scope of gun regulation is the living proof
of the creation of a constitutional construction. Of course, the bitterly
divisive nature of that debate is also proof that we have not settled on
such a construction.
That being so, I make the prescriptive claim that the proper
constitutional construction of the Second Amendment is that it
secures a collective and an individual right. The collective right is
your right (and, perhaps, duty) to serve in the armed services, though
I doubt I shall soon see a freshly applied bumper sticker reading
"Support Your Right to Get Drafted." The individual right is a
limited right to possess firearms for personal self-defense and the
defense of others. As I have argued in an earlier article,' I do not
think this right is anything close to an absolute. A great deal of
regulation of such an individual right can, and should, be permitted.
Individuals who challenge the validity of any such regulations should
be required to prove that the regulation at issue materially infringes
upon the self-defense right. A material infringement is anything that
erects a substantial obstacle to the efforts of a law-abiding, adult,
mentally stable, individual to defend himself by lawful resort to arms.
Once a material infringement has been proven, the government
should have the burden of justifying such an infringement by proving
that it substantially furthers a compelling government objective. I
have elaborated on this argument in an earlier article,65 and will not
detain you with a full explication of the reasons for selection of this as
the standard of review. It will suffice to say that this level of "semistrict" scrutiny would allow a considerable amount of gun regulation
because the needs of public safety are certainly a compelling
objective. Recognition of a limited individual right to gun possession,
however, would allay the fear of gun enthusiasts (or shooters, as they
generally prefer to be called) that the ultimate aim of gun control
advocates is to stamp out private gun possession. As is true now, most
of the battle for settling on a constitutional construction of the Second
64. Massey, supra note 62.
65. Id.
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Amendment would be fought in the political arena, which, perhaps, is
the proper forum for the contest.
CONCLUSION

Identity politics may well drive the manufacture of some
constitutional rights, as Professor Dorf has ably demonstrated. The
identity politics of the Second Amendment may well suggest that an
individual right to gun possession will continue to go unrecognized.
That, however, is not the end of the story. First, the "identity" portion
of the identity politics movement for individual gun rights is clouded
by ignorant and stereotypical thinking on the part of the legal and
cultural elites that, in general, oppose the recognition of individual
gun rights. In any case, the role of identity politics in the manufacture
of constitutional rights is a bit dangerous; one must be justly
suspicious of the least democratic branch of government relying upon
its perceptions of popular trends as the basis for its veto of popularly
enacted legislation. Second, the role of identity politics in supplying
contemporary meaning to the Second Amendment is, at most, more
diffuse than Professor Dorf has suggested, and, at least, of far less
significance than he has suggested. The role of identity politics is
more diffuse because the essential task of interpreting the Second
Amendment is to find a contemporary meaning for a constitutional
provision for which the intended meaning is no longer capable of
accomplishment.
We must thus resort to constitutional cy pres or some other device
to transpose the Second Amendment from its eighteenth-century key
to one understandable to a twenty-first-century ear. When we do so,
we are confronted with the prescriptive question of how much of this
reconstituted interpretation should be fixed in the cast bronze of
constitutional law and how much should be left to the modeling clay
of public debate. I have offered what I believe is a sensible middle
ground: one that is attentive to the impossible-to-attain objectives of
the Second Amendment and which also seeks to resolve a portion of
the contemporary debate by recognizing an incomplete and inchoate
objective of the Second Amendment in constitutional law, while still
leaving most of the terrain free for us-the ultimate sovereigns of our
public life-to resolve.

